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Twenty First Distinction
Question One. Whether after this Life any Sin can be Dismissed
1. “It is also wont to be asked 
etc .” [Lombard, Sent. IV d.21 ch.1 n.1].
2. About this twenty first distinction I first ask this question, whether any sin can be dismissed after this life.
3. That it cannot:
Because no one dying just can afterwards sin; therefore 
no one dying in sin can afterwards rise up. The consequence is plain: first by likeness, because to be able to sin and to rise from sin seem similar for any state; second by what is greater, for it is easier to fall than to rise up; third, because to rise up from sin seems to belong only to him who can merit, but he who cannot in some state fall cannot merit.
4. Again, no mortal sin can be remitted after this life, so neither any venial sin. The consequence is plain because they are of the same idea, since immaterial things only differ as to more and less.
5. Again, Damascene, Orthodox Faith ch.18 says, “What the fall was for angels, this death is for men.” But an angel after the fall cannot at all vary from the state in which he fell; therefore man too after death cannot at all vary from the state in which he dies.
6. Again, a venial sin can be dismissed by the least penalty provided it be voluntary, as by sprinkling with blessed water and the like; but the penalty of death is the greatest, because death is the ultimate of fearful things, Ethics 3.9.1115a26; therefore by it, if it be accepted voluntarily by this person about to die, every venial fault can be deleted; therefore after death none of them remain to be deleted for anyone.
7. If you say that death is inflicted for original sin and therefore it cannot be the penalty due for another sin, nor consequently can it have force to delete or dismiss venial sin - on the contrary: original sin is dismissed in baptism, which is specially ordained against it; therefore death is not in this man a penalty due for original sin; therefore as before [n.6].
8. To the opposite is the Master in the text [Sent. IV d.21 ch.1], and he proves it from Matthew 12.31, Luke 12.10, Mark 3.29-30: “He who sins against the Holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him either in this age or the future one.” And the Master adds, “From this is given to understand, as the holy doctors had on to us, that certain sins will in the future age be dismissed.”
I. To the Question
A. About the Penalty Due for Sin Dismissed in this Life the Conclusion is Certain
9. In this question one conclusion is certain, namely that, when sin has been dismissed in this life, the penalty due for it can be paid after this life.
10. There is proof for this by reason, because no one in debt for a penalty is beatified; for either the penalties are to be paid along with glory or after glory; but in neither way, because penalty cannot either stand with glory or succeed to glory; therefore if anyone is at some time in debt for a penalty, he must first pay it before he be glorified. Now he who was in extremities worthily penitent, which is possible (as was said in the preceding distinction [d.20 nn.12-13, 24]), did not pay a worthy penalty for the sin of which he was penitent; therefore he will pay it after this life.
11. There are authorities too for this, which the Master adduces in the text [Lombard, Sent. IV d.21 ch.2]:
One from Augustine City of God ch.26 n.4, where he treats of I Corinthians 3.12, about those who build wood, hay, stubble. He says, “After the death of this body until the day of damnation or reward is reached, if in this interval of time the spirits of the dead, who have built wood, hay, stubble, are said to suffer a fire of tribulation that is transitory, burning up venial sins, I do not refute it.” And there follows, “That fire will be more grievous than anything a man could suffer in this life” [Exposition of Psalms ps.37 n.3].
12. The same [Ps.-]Augustine, On True and False Penitence (and it is in Gratian, Decretum p.2 cause 33 q.3 d.7 ch.6) about a late penitent says, “If he live with life and not die (understand this of the life of grace), we do not promise that he escape all penalty, for he who has put off the fruit of conversion to the next age is to be purged first with the fire of purgation; but this fire, although it not be eternal, is in a marvelous way grievous; for it excels every penalty that anyone has ever suffered in this life.”
13. And this opinion is stated by the Master, Sent. IV d.20 ch.2 n.1, “If,” he says, “they have departed before fulfilment of their penitence, they will feel the purgatorial fire and will be punished more heavily than if they had fulfilled penitence here.” And no wonder, because the less voluntary a penalty is the less satisfactory it is.
14. And this whole opinion about purgatory is founded on the word of the Apostle in I Corinthians 3.13, “he himself will be saved, but so as by fire” (he is speaking of someone dying imperfect).
B. About the Penalty for Sin not here Dismissed, and About Sin itself not here Dismissed
15. But the other point is not so certain, namely about sin not here dismissed, whether the penalty due for it can be paid in the future and so be remitted; secondly whether such a sin not here dismissed can be dismissed there.
1. About Mortal Sin
16. About the first point [n.15]: it is held as certain that this is not so for mortal sin, because the penalty due for mortal sin when not dismissed is the penalty of damnation, which will not be remitted.
2. About Venial Sin
17. About venial sin one needs to see what penalty corresponds to it according to divine justice.
a. Opinion of Others
18. And it is said [Alexander of Hales, ST II-II n.285 q.1] that an eternal penalty corresponds per se to venial sin, but per accidens a temporal one.
19. Proof of the first, that if someone is damned for mortal sin and along with venial sin, he will always be punished for the venial sin, otherwise there could be redemption in hell from some sin; but he will not be punished by God for it eternally unless an eternal punishment were justly due to it.
20. Proof of the second, that venial sin stands with the charity by which a man is ordained to the kingdom, and consequently for that reason a temporal penalty is due to venial sin.
b. Rejection of the Opinion
α. Against the first Proof
21. Against the first proof [n.19] in three ways:
First, because debt for eternal penalty does not stand along with charity; but along with charity stands not only venial sin not deleted after the act, but also the actually committed venial sin (this is plain according to everyone); therefore etc .
22. Proof of the minor [n.21], because through charity one is worthy of eternal life; if therefore along with this there stand a debt for eternal penalty, then one is at the same time worthy of eternal life and eternal penalty; but this is impossible, because no one can be debtor to eternal penalty for what he is ordained to glory in company with, because then glory and a penalty could stand together.
23. The major is also proved in another way, because after the act of mortal sin nothing remains of mortal sin save the debt of the penalty, as was said in d.14 q.1 nn.28-34. Therefore, if the debt of eternal penalty could stand along with grace, a mortal sin not remitted could, in the way in which it remains after the act, stand along with grace, and then the same person would be friend and enemy.
24. Again, second: the essential penalty of the damned is not the penalty of sense but the penalty of loss; but the penalty of loss is necessarily concomitant to any penalty, because no penalty can stand along with glory; therefore the debt for any eternal penalty includes the debt for the eternal penalty of loss, and consequently for the essential penalty of damnation; but damnation does not correspond to venial sin.
25. Again, third: venial and mortal sin are incommensurable in idea of malice or offense, for an infinity of venial sins, if they existed, would not equal one mortal sin in idea of offense, because neither would all of them turn one away from the end as a single mortal sin does. Therefore, the penalty that, according to justice, corresponds to mortal sin exceeds incommensurably and infinitely the penalty due to venial sin. But it does not incommensurably and infinitely exceed in intensity, because any infinite penalty exceeds or is exceeded finitely by another in intensity; therefore the excess will be in extension.61 Therefore eternal penalty is not due to venial sin.
26. And this conclusion I concede.
27. To the reasoning for the opposite [n.19] it is said in one way [Bonaventure, Aquinas, Richard of Middleton] that eternal penalty is due to venial sin per accidens (when it is conjoined with mortal sin), and not by reason of itself.
28. But this I do not understand, because God always punishes less than is deserving. And let it be that he would, according to rigor simply, punish up to what was fitting, it would be altogether unjust to inflict an eternal penalty for that for which in itself a temporal penalty is due. For however much it may be conjoined with another, this does not make it infinitely exceed the genus of its guilt; therefore, neither does a penalty exceeding to infinity justly correspond to it.
29. I say therefore that to venial sin, whether by punishing it here or in hell or elsewhere, is only due, whether in itself or per accidens, a temporal penalty, because it is in itself the sort of offense that in itself is sufficiently punished by temporal penalty.
30. Nor is it unacceptable for this penalty due to venial sin to have a limit in hell, because someone who is both truly penitent first, and fulfills part of the imposed penitence, and who, before he has fulfilled the whole of it, falls back into mortal sin, and dies in that mortal sin, will pay the penalty in hell for the remaining unfulfilled part of the penitence - but only a temporal penalty because, from the fact that, in the remission of prior sins, the debt of eternal penalty was changed into debt of temporal penalty, he is never in debt for those sins save for temporal penalty, and consequently when the total penalty is paid, he will be free of them.
31. Nor yet will there be redemption for him in hell, namely of the sin for which he is damned, because the debt of eternal penalty for that sin was never commuted into a debt of temporal penalty; and therefore the debt always remains, nor can that penalty ever be totally paid.
β. Against the Second Proof
32. About the second conclusion [n.20]:
It can be said that in one way it is so, because the remission of venial sin is nothing other than payment of the temporal penalty due for it.
33. The proof is that, after the act ceases, the guilt, which remains, is nothing but conviction for the due penalty; but being convicted for venial sin is nothing but being convicted for temporal penalty (from the preceding article [n.29]), and consequently, when the temporal penalty has been paid in purgatory for this venial sin, by this very fact is the venial guilt remitted.
34. But it is not so with mortal sin, because the penalty due for it cannot be totally paid unless the eternal penalty is first commuted into a temporal one; and this commutation is called remission of mortal guilt. But this remission only happens through an ordered voluntary displeasure of a sort that is not had after death.
Thus is one way plain as to how, after death, mortal sin cannot be remitted, but only the penalty due for mortal sin previously dismissed.
35. But venial sin previously committed and not dismissed can be dismissed after death, because the total penalty due for it can be paid, and thereby will it be remitted.
36. But this way is not satisfactory, because the saints seem to distinguish between remission of guilt of any sort and remission of penalty, and especially between remission of guilt and payment of the penalty due for the guilt.
37. It can be said in another way that venial sin in this life can be remitted, not only through interior or exterior penalty (because for this purpose that is not necessary), but through some act more accepted by God than the venial sin displease him - and this either referred by the doer himself to the remission of venial sin, or not referred by him but by God accepting it in its order thereto.
38. To the issue at hand: the works of this man who dies in charity, although after death they not be referred by him for the dismissing of the venial sin in which he died, and although too he not have any meritorious new act by which venial sin may be deleted, yet the works he did before can be referred by God to the remission of his venial sin after death.
39. And that in the following way: a cause that can be impeded does not, while it is impeded, realize its effect; however when it is not impeded it does realize it; but the merits of this man dying in charity would be sufficient cause for deletion of his venial sins, whether referred by himself or referred by God accepting the works in their order to this. Now his merits are, while he lives, impeded if he remains always actually in venial sin; after death, however, they are not impeded because then he is not continuing the act of venial sin; therefore his venial sins will be destroyed by them after this life.
C. Two Corollaries
40. From this follow two things: first, that at the moment of death venial sins are remitted, because the act of venial sin does not then remain and consequently the impediment then ceases; the other, that the venial sin of someone dying in charity is remitted in this life, unless he continue the act of venial sin until death or the moment of death.
41. This second one seems probable, unless you say God has ordained that the good merits of this person will be reserved in divine acceptation until the moment of death, when, of course, he ceases to be a wayfarer, and consequently that then God gives back to him the good corresponding to his merits, but not so for any prior instant when he was a wayfarer.
42. This is probable in other cases because, since any merit (as I believe) merits an increase of grace (because it merits some determinate degree of glory for which some degree of grace is required as preceding disposition), and since God does not always, after any meritorious act, increase grace proportionate to merit, it seems that the increase due to remitted merits he keeps in reserve until the moment of death.
43. And it is the same way about this deletion of venial sins, which is a sort of non-principal reward of these merits, just as it is also an increase of charity in such or such a degree.
44. And this is reasonable, because at that moment [sc. of death] a man first comes to be in another state; and the state of being wayfarer (or something concomitant to this sort of state) was what prevented the reward of merits being rendered to him. And it is not necessary to indicate here that this reserving for the moment of death is reasonable because a man is then, on account of impending very great trials, most of all in need - for this is not true, because at the moment of death the soul is separated from the body and consequently is not a wayfarer but at the term, nor consequently is it then exposed to trials.
45. If neither of these ways [n.40] is pleasing (neither the first, namely that it is the same thing for venial sin to be remitted and for the penalty due to it to be paid; nor the second, namely because by merits acquired as wayfarer and reserved in divine acceptation, venial sin may be destroyed at the moment of death), let another way be looked for, which it is difficult to find. For that there is some good movement by which, as by a disposition or merit by congruity or desert, venial sin be destroyed in the soul after death, does not seem consonant with theological doctrine, which posits that that state is immune from these things.
II. To the Initial Arguments
46. To the arguments.
To the first [n.3]: when taking ‘rising from sin’ to stand for ‘to be freed from sin’ I deny the consequence,
47. To the first proof [n.3], I say that there is no likeness, because ‘to sin’ is to act freely even as to this state of life; but to rise up, that is, to become immune from sin, does not require acting freely even as a wayfarer on the way; because, according to the first opinion [nn.18-20], to rise is only to pay the penalty, and this is to suffer it; or, according to the second opinion [nn.21-23], only through merits possessed as wayfarer before, and for that time accepted, is guilt now dismissed.
48. To the second proof of the consequence [n.3] I concede that it is easier to fall than to rise up, insofar as ‘rise up’ states a simply ordered act in the power of the one who rises; but in the remission of venial sin ‘rise up’ is not taken in this way [n.47].
49. To the third proof I say that it assumes something false, namely that ‘to rise’ is by a meritorious act that is then present. However, it is by a meritorious act that was present before, according to the second opinion; or by no meritorious act but only by suffering a deserved penalty for the sin, according to the first opinion.
50. To the second argument [n.4]: the consequence is not valid, and the reason is stated in the first opinion (and this according to that opinion). But according to the second opinion one would have to say that merits done in this life cannot be accepted at the moment of death for the deletion through them of mortal sin; because God has disposed mortal sin to be deleted only through the voluntary reception of the sacrament, or through some disposition meritorious, as it were, by congruity that is inherent then, or up to then, when the sin is destroyed. This is not so of him who dies in mortal sin.
51. To the proof [n.4] I say that although mortal and venial sin are of the same idea in genus of nature, or perhaps in malice of mores, just as the genus of virtue is distinct from what is of grace and what is sin (for it is not the same thing to be virtuous and vicious morally and to be just and a sinner theologically); but yet these are not of the same genus or idea in idea of divine offense; and so they are not remitted in the same way.
52. To the third [n.5]: the likeness goes this far, that as an angel when falling is at the term and not a wayfarer, so also is a man in death. But there need not be a likeness as to stable permanence in everything, but as to stable permanence in that which is principal in one who is already reaching the term. Off this sort is spiritual life by grace or spiritual death by mortal sin; and if a man die in the life of grace he will always live; but he who dies in mortal sin will remain so.
53. But about venial sin there need not be such stability, because venial sin is not something according to which the good or bad state of way or term is per se assessed. Or venial sin can stand with a good state and with a bad state, whether of the way or of the term; but when venial sin exists with a good state of the term, it must be deleted first before the ultimate term be fully possessed.
54. As to the fourth [n.6], it could well be conceded that death voluntarily accepted is a sufficient penalty as to the penalty of any venial sin, and perhaps as to a great part of the penalty due for mortal sins that have been dismissed. Nor is it a problem that it is a necessary penalty, because someone can voluntarily accept what is necessary. And so by this is what is said in the second opinion (that venial sin is deleted at the moment of death) consonant with what is said in the first opinion, that if it be remitted by the payment alone of the penalty, the penalty is paid in death; and in this way is venial sin remitted.
Question Two. Whether a Confessor is in Every Case Bound to Hide a Sin Uncovered to him in Confession
55. Second I ask whether a confessor is in every case bound to hide a sin uncovered to him in confession.
56. It seems that he is not:
Because it is licit for anyone to renounce his right; therefore , since it is a confessing penitent’s right to hide his sin, it is licit for him to renounce this right by giving his confessor permission not to be bound to hide it.
57. Again, Bernard On Precept and Dispensation ch.2 n.5, “What was instituted for charity should not militate against charity.” But the hiding of a confessed sin might in some case militate against charity; therefore etc . Proof of the minor: sometimes a confessed sin would be against the common good, as a crime of heresy or betrayal of the republic; and most of all, if it were perceived from confession that this was not only done but to be done, it seems to be contrary to charity to make light of the common good because of some good of a private person.
58. Again, suppose that some persons have agreed together to kill a priest in such and such a woodland, and the priest is traveling with them; before the entrance to the woodland one of them repents and confesses to the same priest; the priest is not bound, since the others are not penitent, to expose himself to death without cause, and therefore not bound to enter the woodland. But by not entering it he by that fact reveals to the other associates the confession of the associate who confessed (for he would not have turned away from accompanying them if this associate had not confessed); therefore in this and the like deeds it is licit to reveal a confession [Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.21 princ. 4 q.2 arg.5].
59. Again, a priest has absolved in fact a simoniac bishop whom he cannot by right absolve; this priest is bound to confess this sin specifically and with that circumstance, because it is a mortal sin and these circumstances make the sin worse; but by thus confessing he reveals the sin of this simoniac bishop; therefore etc .
60. It is licit to reveal what is not a sin or a circumstance of sin; but such is the person (suppose her to be this woman or that woman) with whom a confessing penitent has sinned - since this is not an aggravating circumstance.
61. Again, an abbot who has a monk in a place belonging to his monastery knows through confession that the monk has sinned in that place and there keeps suspect company, by whom he is often enticed to sin. It seems that the abbot could consult the salvation of his soul; therefore he can remove him from that care or that office, so that he not have an occasion of this sort for sinning. But by removing him the abbot, by that fact, reveals his confession, because he does the sort of thing he would not do if this person had not confessed to him, whereby others too can come to knowledge of the sin, at least in universal terms.
62. Again, Gregory IX, Decretals V tit.30 ch.14, ‘On Sentence of Excommunication’, “You must keep away from communion with him who, for raising his hands against a cleric, has fallen under edict of excommunication, unless perhaps to you alone the fact lie open, in which case you will avoid him only in private;” and there follows, “so that he may, in confusion at least by blushing for shame, be compelled to make satisfaction for his hidden excess.” From this is obtained, it seems that, if in secret or by confession I know that this person has fallen into sentence of excommunication, I must avoid him in private so that he may be put to confusion; therefore, it is licit, because of confession, to inflict confusion on someone and therefore, by parity of reasoning, to reveal his sin.
63. On the contrary: Gratian, Decretum p.2 cause 33 q.3, ‘On Penitence’, d.6 ch.2 [Lombard Sent. IV d.21 ch.9 n.1], “A priest should before all things beware lest he tell to another the sins that have been confessed to him; for if he do this, let him be deposed and let him for all the days of his life go through his pilgrimage in ignominy.”
64. Again, Gregory IX, Decretals V tit.38 ch.12, ‘On Penitences and Remissions’, “Let a priest altogether take care lest by word or sign or in any other way he betray a sinner;” and there follows, “If he have presumed to reveal a sin uncovered to him, we have decreed that he not only be deposed from priestly office, but that he is in the strictest monastery to be thrust down into performing the strictest penitence.”
I. To the Question
A. Statement of Five Conclusions
65. In this question let the first conclusion be that a priest is bound by the law of nature to hide sin uncovered to him in confession; let the second be that he is bound to it by divine positive law; the third that he is bound to it by the positive law of the Church; the fourth that he is bound as to the ‘when’ and the ‘how’ and other pertinent circumstances; fifth that he is bound as to other things secret or in secret uncovered to another.
B. Proof of the Conclusions
1. About the First Conclusion
a. Proof of the First Conclusion by Others
66. The first conclusion is proved as follows [Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.21 princ.4 q.1]:
“The same person can, when speaking in the person of another, truly affirm something that he would truly deny speaking in his own person (proof: the angel speaking to Moses in the person of God truly said, ‘I am the Lord your God etc .’, Exodus 20.2, which he would have truly denied speaking in his own person). Therefore , by similarity a man when representing the person of God in the forum of confession can truly affirm something that he can truly deny outside that forum when speaking in his own person. Therefore , when saying outside the forum that he had heard or knows those things, he is lying, because they only came to his knowledge insofar he was representing the person of God. But to avoid a lie belongs to the right of nature, and especially a pernicious lie; therefore etc .” b. Refutation of the Aforesaid Proof
b. Refutation of the Aforesaid Proof
67. Against this reasoning it can be argued:
First as follows, that it belongs to the same person, and as the same person, to take cognizance in a case and to give sentence in it (this is manifest because it is this person and as this person who is for this purpose taking cognizance). But a priest does not give sentence in God’s person but in his own when absolving a confessing penitent; therefore as such does he hear and take cognizance. Proof of the minor: a priest does not absolve principally but ministerially; but to absolve ministerially only belongs to him in his own person. For if he were to speak in the person of God when absolving a confessing penitent he could, without preceding prayer (which is “May the Lord absolve you”), say “I absolve you principally and I infuse grace into you,” as the angel truly said in the person of God, “I brought you out of the land of Egypt” [Exodus 20.2].
68. Again, in the forum of confession a priest does not hear or absolve in the person of God more than he confects the Eucharist in the person of God, because the former act is excellent just as the latter is and a sacramental act where divine virtue operates as here. Indeed, the priest seems to act more in the person of God or in the person of Christ in the latter than the former; for in the latter he speaks the words of Christ ‘my body’ and in the person of Christ, about which words he prefaces, “Who on the day before he died etc.,” such that he himself says the whole of “Take etc.” and “this is etc.,” by reciting the words of Christ. It is not so in the issue at hand. Hence the priest does not preface in confession “Christ, wishing to absolve the sinner, spoke thus, ‘I absolve you’,” but the ‘I’ stands here for the person of the minister himself. From this is it plain that the priest confects in the person of Christ more not less than he absolves or hears confession. But he confects in his own person, and what he knows as confecting he knows in his own person; hence he does not lie when after mass he says, “I know that I consecrated today.” Therefore in confession too.
69. Again, to speak of sins uncovered in confession, albeit universally and not referred in particular to the person confessing, is to speak according to the same way and according to the same truth [n.68], as will be proved later [n.97].
70. This is also proved by Gregory IX, Decretals V tit.38 ch.9, ‘On Penitences and Remissions’, where Innocent III responds to a certain cardinal legate who had written to him of a case he had heard in confession and sought his advice. The Pope did not refute him as to the revelation in general, in writing too, but replies how one should advise such a person confessing.
71. This is also plain from the common practice of confessors for, whether in common speech or in preaching, they sometimes say, “Such a case occurred,” “Someone sinned in such or such a way.” The proposition, therefore, is obtained that a confessor can licitly state outside confession a sin confessed to him, but so that he in no way state something related to the person confessing from which knowledge of him could be reached.
72. But if the aforesaid reasoning [of Richard, n.66] were valid this would not be licit, because the confessor would be lying. Proof: because he who does not know a particular save as a determinate singular does not know the particular if he not know the singular; but this confessor does not know that some person has done such a sin save as this person confessed by him and as this sin confessed to him; therefore if he would be lying about this person and this sin because ignorant of them [sc. outside confession], he would be lying similarly about other person and other sin.62
73. I concede, therefore, these arguments [nn.67-72], for it is not because a revealer may be lying63 that revelation [of confession] is against the law of nature. And so I do not hold this first argument [n.66].
74. I reply to the argument, therefore, that it is not the same thing to speak in the person of another and to speak with his authority or as his minister. For commonly he who speaks in the person of another simply projects the person, as is commonly the case in those who jokingly imitate others. For when he imitates the stutterer or the like in a like act, and does so by talking as he would talk, it is in his person that he is speaking or doing what he does; and therefore as soon as he fails to act as that person would and to talk as he would it is said to him ‘You are lying’ or ‘you are doing it wrong’, although then he is acting or speaking in his own proper voice. This is how it is with the speakings of angels in the person of God [n.66].
75. Not thus does a priest hear confession or absolve in the person of God, but he is only a minister of God in the act and as a minister he acts; therefore he acts in his own person.
76. I concede, therefore, that if he were to hear in the person of God and to speak in the person of God, he could say something truly that he could not say in his own person; for in the person of God he would truly say this, ‘I am God’, ‘I created the world’, and the like; but speaking so in his own person he would lie. But the priest in confession neither hears nor speaks in the person of God but in his own person, although with the authority of God and as his minister. The same way in other sacraments. Hence as minister of God he baptizes and consecrates, and yet as man or in his own person he knows that he has baptized, and he can say without lying that he has baptized.
c. Scotus’ own Reasons for the First Conclusion
77. I maintain the first conclusion [n.65], therefore.
78. But I set down four other reasons, the first of which is taken from the idea of charity, the second from the idea of fidelity, the third from the idea of truth, the fourth from the idea of unity or mutual utility.
79. The first is of this sort: the law of nature about fraternal charity is expressed in Matthew 7.12, “Everything that you want men to do to you, do it to them; for this is the law and the prophets,” and Luke 6.31, “As you want men to do to you, do you also to them.” The proposition of natural law about fraternal charity must be understood in like way: “What you want for yourself,” that is, what you should want according to right reason, and this is understood in the proposition of Matthew 22.39, “Love your neighbor as yourself.” But each should according to right reason love his own reputation, therefore love also the hiding of his confessed sin; and consequently the confessor should love and want the same thing for him who has confessed. But revelation [of his confessed sin] would take from him his reputation. Therefore etc .
80. Proof of the major:
From Scripture, Ecclesiasticus 41.15, “Have care for your good name,” and it gives a reason for this, “For this will be more lasting for you than a thousand great and precious treasures.” It proves it too by something else it adds, “There is a number of days for a good life; but a good name will last forever.” And Proverbs 22.1, “Better is a good name than much riches.”
81. Again, this is proved by reason: for everyone should according to right reason want civil life for himself; but this is taken away by the removal of reputation, because one lives with civil life in this, that one is fit for the legitimate acts that belong to oneself in that civil existence; but when reputation is lost one is deprived of one’s fitness for such acts, because one has lost the status of undamaged dignity, that is, fitness for the acts that one would otherwise be worthy of.
82. The second part of the minor, namely that the revealing of confessed sin takes this sort of reputation from him who has confessed [n.79], is proved by the fact that a reason whereby it can be revealed to one is a reason whereby it can be revealed to another, and so to everyone; but in such revealing it is manifest that the status of undamaged reputation (which consists in his reputation among fellow citizens) is taken from him.
83. The second reason: everyone is by the law of nature bound to keep with his neighbor the fidelity he wants and should want to keep with himself; but he who commits to another a very great secret wants and should want it to be kept secret; therefore another to whom he has committed it is bound to keep it for him. This reason is touched on in Proverbs 11.13. “He who walks deceitfully reveals secrets; but he who is faithful hides what a friend has done.”
84. The third reason: everyone is bound by the law of nature to keep a lawful promise; but he who receives a secret, especially what is uncovered in confession, promises, if not explicitly yet implicitly, that he will keep it, because without such a promise, at least implicitly understood, such a secret would not be committed to him; therefore etc . This reason can be taken from the remark, “Speak ye truth everyone with his neighbor” [Zechariah 8.16, Ephesians 4.25].
85. The fourth reason: any community has a unity proportionate in this to the unity of the body of Christ, that there is an order there of superior and inferior; and the superior is bound to exercise influence over the inferior, and the inferior is bound to minister to the superior, according to the parable of St. Paul about the mystical body of Christ in diverse places [Romans 12.4-5, I Corinthians 6.15-20, 12.4-7, Colossians 1.18]. But in civil society the inferior is less sufficient to himself and less knowing, and in the Church the sinner is unknowing but the superior is a hierarch who is able both to advise and to reconcile. Therefore, it is of the law of nature that no one exclude the inferior from recourse to a superior in necessities, nor exclude the superior from influence over an inferior, because this is a the common utility of the members with each other. But the revealing of a secret excludes the inferior from such recourse to a superior in advice of soul, and consequently excludes the superior from influence over the inferior; because no one would have recourse if that about which he asks advice or remedy did not regularly have to be kept secret; therefore the superior is bound to hide this secret by the same law of nature by which anyone is bound to keep the unity of the mystical body of Christ, and bound to keep the common utility of others as the members do in the body.
2. About the Second Conclusion
86. Proof of the second conclusion [n.65], namely that the priest is bound by positive divine Law:
First as follows: every Christian is bound not to give to another an occasion by which he may be called away from a law of Christ; there is a law of Christ about making confession, as was shown in d.17 [nn.48-57]; therefore everyone is bound not to draw another away from making confession; but he who reveals a confession, once the occasion has been given, draws back others from confession.
87. If you say that although this priest reveal [a confession] yet another will be a hider of the secret - this is nothing, because this priest, as far as his own part is concerned, gives occasion to the other to be wary of individual confessors in the same way.64
88. Again second thus: Christ establishment the judgment of penitence to be on earth the final one as to confessed crime. This is plain from the verse of Matthew 16.19, “Whatever you loose on earth will be loosed also in heaven,” that is, it will be finally and ultimately approved, and from John 20.23, “Whose sins you remit etc .,” supply: sins remitted receive final approval in divine judgment. Therefore , whoever takes something discussed and ended finally in this forum [of confession] to another forum sins against the Law of Christ; but he who reveals [a confession] makes it, as far as concerns himself, something that could be taken to another forum, namely the public forum; therefore etc .
89. Third as follows: he who gives occasion to sin mortally in the carrying out of a precept of Christ sins mortally because, as far as concerns himself, he makes what needed to be duly carried out to be unduly carried out; but he who reveals a confession gives occasion for unduly carrying out the precept of Christ about confession, because occasion for doing it deceitfully; because he gives occasion for someone to praise himself in confession and to blame another whom he hates, so that thus he himself may by the confessor be unworthily promoted and the other punished; therefore etc .
3. About the Third Conclusion
90. The third conclusion, namely that such concealing belongs to the positive right of the Church, is plain from what was alleged for the opposite [nn.63-64], the second argument of which was better and more reasonable. For [against the first argument, n.63] it is not expedient that someone be made a vagabond because of a crime, provided however his common or solitary sojourn among men can in some way be tolerated; for a vagabond would be more abandoned to his evil will, and so would sin and cause harm more, both as regard himself and as regard others, than if he were delivered over to a strict custody.
4. About the Fourth Conclusion
91. About the fourth conclusion it is necessary to look at ‘who’ and ‘for whom’ and ‘when’.
About ‘who’ I say that not only is the confessor bound to concealment but also he to whom the confessor, though illicitly, reveals it. The proof is that he who transfers something to another de facto that he cannot licitly transfer de iure does not give the other the right to use it or the right to transfer it to another; because he is, from the fact of not having the right, unable to transfer the right to another, for no one gives what he does not have [Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 2.5/ ch.22.178b1-7]. But a confessor who reveals something does not have the right to transfer it to another; therefore, if he in fact transfers it, the other does not have the right to transfer it further.
92. I say the same of him who, being someone other than the confessor, hears the confession of a confessing penitent; for if he hears by chance he does not sin but he is bound to silence; if he hears by deceit he sins mortally, and along with this he is bound to silence.
93. These two conditions about ‘who’ [nn.91-92] are proved by the reasons set down above for the first and second conclusion [nn.78-89].
94. But ‘when’? I say always and at all times [sc. one is bound to conceal what is said in confession, n.65], because the precept is a negative one.65 And from this follows that after the death of the person confessed no more [sc. is one released from concealing] than when he was alive, because the reasons posited for the first and second conclusion are conclusive as equally about concealment at both times as they are about a negative precept.
95. But as for the ‘to whom’ [one may not reveal a confession] it is said [William of Auxerre]: to anyone save a superior.
But the aforesaid reasons [nn.91-94] are conclusive about a superior as about an inferior, save in a case when the inferior cannot absolve but receives [a confession] so as to refer it to a superior who can absolve; and then he himself is not confessor, but one must reckon that the one confessing to him as to an inferior is telling it to him as to an interpreter only. And then the whole thing stands as a single act of confession, where the one confessing and the superior (who alone is then the confessor) are the to be judged and the judge; and the intermediary (who hears and refers) is only an interpreter, yet he is bound to silence as regard everyone beside him for whom he is interpreter.
96. If you say that thereby is a response given to a certain argument previously made in Gregory IX, Decretals etc. [n.70], because there an inferior tells a superior a sin confessed to him, and consequently the chapter is not proof that it is licit for anyone universally to state sins heard outside the forum of confession - this is nothing, because the cardinal did not write to the Pope so that the Pope might absolve, but he wrote requesting advice about what he himself should do, as is plain from the response of the Pope, who does not immediately absolve the woman as to what he supposed was a birth foreign to her, but replies to him how a discrete priest ought to advise the woman. And similarly could advice be requested in such a doubt not only from a superior but from any other prudent man, who of course would know how to give advice.
97. Hence what is said there against the first reason [n.69] is true generally, namely that the sin of a confessing penitent that is not referred back to, or made determinate relative to, the person confessing can be stated by the confessor, and usefully so, indeed necessarily so, when the priest is not so skilled that he know himself how to advise; and then he usefully can and necessarily should state it to someone prudent who knows how to advise him.
98. But surely a Pope can command that it be revealed to him? I reply: one should say that a Pope can never go beyond the right of nature.
99. About the ‘what’ I say that not only [must be concealed] the main sin of the one confessing and the circumstances of the sin (because circumstances cannot well be revealed without revealing the fact), but also the second person with whom the sin was done.
100. This is plain from the reasons posited for the first and second conclusion [nn.79-89], because even the one confessing wants to preserve the reputation of the person with whom he sinned, that is, he should want it as he wants his own reputation, indeed more so because that person was joined with him in the crime; for he is so much the more bound to that person for restitution of the good that he lost through him, and for guarding the good that, notwithstanding the evil committed, can be guarded.
101. Fidelity too and truth and unity or community [n.78] are plain here as before [nn.79-85].
102. Plain, likewise, for the three reasons for the second conclusion [nn.86-89] because not concealing draws away from confession; it also takes what is aired in this forum to another forum, and is an occasion for lying in this forum, as was said before.
5. About the Fifth Conclusion
103. About the fifth conclusion it is said [Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.21 princ.5 q.4] that one is bound by the law of nature to keep every secret, for the reasons given for the first conclusion [nn.79-85]; not only when the one confessing himself makes it express that he wants to commit it as secret, but also whenever it appears from the manner of committing that he wants to commit it as secret.
104. But the reasons for the second conclusion [nn.86-89] do not prove this with equal evidence save the third [n.89], that occasion would be given for lying when committing some secrets to someone.
105. As to this article [sc. this fifth conclusion] I say that the same ecclesiastical penalties are not inflicted for any secret as for this this secret [of confession]. But if someone were to reveal publicly some other secret a different penalty would be imposed on him, namely bad reputation. For he who imputes a false crime or anything that he cannot prove is to be regarded as a calumniator [Gregory IX, Decretals V tit.2 chs.1-2]; such is he who reveals any secret crime that the cannot prove.
II. To the Initial Arguments
106. To the arguments.
To the first [n.56] I say that it is a right not only of the one confessing that a confessed sin ought to be concealed but it is a right of the community, for there would follow from the opposite (namely from the revelation of it) continual disturbance in the community, because everyone everywhere would reckon the other abominable; and it is not licit for this person to renounce the right of the community, though it is licit for him to renounce his own.
107. It could be said in another way: let it be also that it were only his own right and a right granted in his favor, it would not be licit for him to renounce it so that the confessor would be free to reveal things; for a confessor is bound by multiple right, namely the right of nature and positive right, the revoking of none of which is in the power of the one confessing.
108. What then will the confessor do when the one confessed is willing for his sin to be made public?
I say that the one confessing is able to state his sin afterwards outside confession, and if he state it as secret the subsequent permission still does not absolve the confessor from the law of nature without him being bound to conceal it. But if the one confessing state it so it not be held secret, and especially before some person or some certain persons for whom it is perhaps licit because of some good end that can follow from the revelation made to them or him - then the confessor can say it as something said to him publicly outside all secrecy.
109. But surely he cannot then say “I heard this in confession”?
I reply: it might be said [Thomas Aquinas, Sent. IV d.21 q.3 a.3] that these words by themselves “I heard this sin in that person’s confession” include mortal sin, because they include a revealing of the sin as known in a way it is not licit for it to revealed. Hence, he to whom it is revealed outside all secrecy after confession should be wary in his manner of speaking and talking, lest he tell it as something said to him in a way in which it is not licit for it to be revealed.
110. Against this: it is licit for him to say to whom he will what is told him outside confession, and the telling is not special by the fact he says it was confessed to him; therefore, it is licit for him to say it.
111. To the second [n.57] I say that there can be no case in which silence militates against charity; on the contrary, the opposite would militate against common charity, as was shown by the four reasons for the first conclusion [nn.79-85].
112. And when you make objection about the common good [n.57], I say “you shall do justly what is just,” Deuteronomy 16.20; therefore you shall do charitably what is of charity; but he does not act charitably who, against the law of nature in the aforesaid ways [nn.79-85], does not conceal some evil committed or to be committed. Therefore, the verse of the jurists is to be rejected that “Heresy is a crime that not even confession conceals” - not that the metre is not good but the opinion is false.
113. To the third [n.58] it can be said that the priest can possess multiple occasions for not entering the woodland other than from the malice of the thieves uncovered to him - at least he can think out multiple others and say in their presence, “I wish to do this and that,” “I wish to turn aside to that and that place before I proceed further;” and if he seem to turn aside for this sort of alleged occasion, he reveals the confession neither in word nor deed.
114. But if he cannot turn aside for any occasion without it appearing to the others that he was turning aside because of a confession, and without in this revealing a confession, someone says [Richard of Middleton, ibid. n.58] that he is bound to enter the woodland, and if he expose himself to death, this is for a right cause, namely that he may keep the Law of God about the seal of confession; and consequently if he dies he is a martyr.
115. But it can be said in another way that facts can be ambiguous signs, because they can be conceived in diverse ways by diverse people, namely for this or that fact. Therefore [the fact of not entering the woodland] should not be reckoned a revealing of confession unless of its nature it make public the confessed sin. But to turn aside from the woodland does not so lead, because if they had said nothing beforehand about the killing, never would they recognize, from the fact the priest turns aside, that that other confessed about their intention to kill him. But if turning aside were of its own nature a sign leading to knowledge of the sin of the one who confessed, it would lead anyone to this knowledge, and them equally too if they had not spoken just as if they had spoken.
116. It can therefore be said in general that a sign that is of itself indifferent as to the fact that such a sin was confessed or not confessed, though it be for some a more determinate sign because of some supposition, is not a sign that of itself is revelatory of confession, nor consequently is it simply illicit for a confessor.
117. To the fourth [n.59] I say that a confessor who incautiously ministers the sacrament of penitence is not bound to confess at once his incautious deed, namely when his confessor will be able at once to arrive at the knowledge of the person about whom he incautiously exercised the use of the keys; and this at least, he is not bound to express in detail the fault about which and the manner in which he acted incautiously, but either precisely in universal terms, “by my fault I unduly and incautiously ministered the sacrament of penitence,” or if his conscience about giving confession in this matter specifically weigh on him, as the argument says [n.59] (because it is a special and a mortal sin and the circumstances make it specifically worse), he is bound to wait for an opportunity to confess to someone who cannot, from such confession of sin and circumstances, arrive at a knowledge of the person who confessed to him.
118. But if such a confessor can never be obtained without being able, from the explanation of the sin and the circumstances, to arrive at the fault and the person who confessed to him, he is in a case of being unable to confess to man, for he is more bound to the precept of not making public a sin confessed to him than to explicit confession of his own fault; because he is bound to the first in many ways by the law of nature (as the reasons for the first conclusion prove [nn.79-85]), and in many ways by the divine positive law (as the reasons for the second conclusion prove [nn.86-89]); but to the second he is bound at most by the divine positive law, as was said in d.17 {nn.42-57]; therefore let him confess66 to God.
119. From this follows that anyone ministering the sacrament of penitence must beware most of all lest he minister incautiously, precisely in the case where from his incaution he will not be able to be penitent explicitly without betraying the confession of another who confessed to him
120. To the fifth [n.60]: let it be that the second person not make the sin worse, as the fact that it be Bertha or Alice does not make fornication worse, other things being equal (as that she is not married, not a close relative, and the rest of the sort), and then it is fatuous to confess the second person. And one might doubt whether to make her explicit in this way be a mortal sin (whether in other respects or whether the second person was then made explicit in a way in which she necessarily had to be made explicit); always does the second person fall under the seal of confession, as was said in the fourth article [nn.99-100].
121. And then the major is to be denied in the first case [n.60]: “it is licit to reveal what is not a sin or a circumstance of sin,” for in order for this to be true it must be added “nor anything by which one could reach the person or knowledge of the person confessing.” Or more should be added to the major, namely “nor anything that must be held to be secret by the law of nature or the divine law.” And the minor is manifestly false about the second person, as is plain from the fourth article [nn.99-100].
122. To the sixth [n.61] I say that if in a college there is a common custom that anyone prolonging a stay outside the monastery (whether having a curacy or without a curacy) may, without notice, be recalled at the will of the president, or even not at will everywhere, but sometimes for another honest cause (so that now he rests in the cloister, now labors with Martha in exterior ministry, and now this one does and now that one, insofar as it has seemed useful to the president) - I say then that a monk who has made confession of a crime committed in some place outside the monastery where he is staying can be recalled by the abbot to the monastery, because in this the abbot does in no way make public a sin confessed to him; although someone may say that a confessor can, by reason of confession, in no way be disposed to the one who confessed as to any act outside that forum otherwise than if he had heard absolutely nothing. But if the custom in the college is that a monk is not thus transferred to the cloister from a place outside save by reason of some failing or insufficiency in his curacy of the place, it does not then seem licit for the abbot to recall the confessed monk to the monastery.
123. If you say that ‘he is not applying or procuring a remedy for the salvation of his sheep’ - I reply: let him consult him in a better way in the forum of penitence, whereby he may know to dismiss him a place that is dangerous. But if he will not [sc. be consulted in penitence], let the abbot not attempt to be God, but let him dismiss hidden failings to the correction of God that, according to justice, cannot be corrected by himself.
124. To the last argument [n.62] I say that that chapter is not expressly speaking of him who knows through confession that someone is excommunicated, not even by way of a secret committed to him; but he knows it privately, that is, he thus knows what the community does not know, or what he believes the community does not know, and knowing thus in private he must avoid him in private. And no wonder, because he is not in debt to the other for it as it is secret [sc. he has no debt to associate with him in secret].
125. But if he knew through the form of confession only, what should he do?
I reply as to the third argument [nn.113-116], that if he can avoid him in another way than through an avoidance that betrays his excommunication, he must avoid him; but if not he should not only not avoid him, but rather is it not licit for him to avoid him. For avoidance of someone excommunicated is by ecclesiastical positive right only; he is bound not to betray him by the law of nature and by ecclesiastical and divine positive right. And when precepts seem contrary, that which is superior is more obligatory and is therefore to be kept more firmly. Nor by keeping it and omitting the other does he sin, because no one is in perplexity because of divine law and ecclesiastical law.67